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"Unchanging  work  at a uniform  task  kills  the explosive flow  of a man's  animal  spirits, 
which  draw  refreshing  zest from  a simple  change  of activity." 
-Karl  Marx 
THE REFRESHING  ZEST  of recent days apparently  would not have sur- 
prised  Karl  Marx,'  although  presumably  he would  have been amazed  at 
the changes  in the former  Soviet Union and  the assertiveness  of its con- 
stituent states following August's failed coup and the collapse of the 
Communist  party.  He would  not be alone, as policymakers  and  analysts 
everywhere  adjust  to the transformed  political  and  economic  landscape, 
in which the former  republics  dominate.  Even Grigory  Yavlinsky, the 
talented and most ubiquitous  all-union reformer, has concluded that 
there "is no place for reform  on an all-union  level."  2 Certainly  part  of 
the aftermath  of the failed  coup will be a wider  acceptance  of the neces- 
sity of recognizing  and  accommodating  parallel  economic  reform  efforts 
in the sovereign  states that  will now emerge. 
This change  of focus has not been fully welcomed by all in the West. 
At a political  level, President  George  Bush finds  it easier  to contemplate 
dealing  with  a single  entity  headed  by a familiar  Mikhail  Gorbachev  than 
to think  about  dealing  with some unknown  number  of unfamiliar  states. 
On the economic plane, many of those Western  analysts who were not 
completely  overwhelmed  by the complexity of the required  changes in 
the Soviet economy used to take comfort  in the hope that  there  could be 
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1. Marx  as quoted  in Andrews  (1990,  p. 289). 
2. Frances  X. Clines, "A Bleak Economy Dims Soviet Hopes for a Free Market," 
New York  Times,  September  9, 1991,  p. Al. 
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a single macroeconomic  policy, currency, and legal framework.3  But 
this hope for a centrally  planned  reform  has never been embraced  out- 
side Moscow, and  the new centers of power will be loathe to cede much 
back  to the old center.4  Those interested  in assisting  in economic  reform 
must  address  this new reality. 
My purpose  here  is to highlight  some of the arguments  behind  and  im- 
plications  of the necessary  evolution  of multilateral  economic  reform  ef- 
forts, motivated  and illustrated  by the case of Ukraine.  The precise na- 
ture  of the future  economic confederation  in the former  Soviet Union is 
far from clear. Anything  is possible, from a relatively centralized, al- 
though smaller, transformed  union to a looser confederation  that in- 
cludes the Baltics and  nearly  all of Eastern  Europe. However, it is clear 
that the demands  for greater  autonomy  in economic policy cannot be 
met with yet another reform plan that presumes a strong controlling 
center. 
Problems in Soviet Economic Reform 
Most of the well-recognized  problems of formerly  planned econo- 
mies are visiting  themselves  on the component  entities of the old Soviet 
Union. Indeed, compared with the Eastern European countries of 
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and Poland, not to mention  East Germany, 
the problems  in the Soviet Union are acknowledged  to be far  more  diffi- 
cult. The memory  of political  independence  and  a market  economy is far 
dimmer  in the latter, and the wreckage  of central  planning  is at least as 
pervasive. As Anders  Aslund  remarked,  "The Soviet economic system 
has been counted out many times before, but never has it appeared  so 
devoid of advantages. 
Predictions  of a Soviet fiscal crisis have been borne out by events.6 
3. For a summary  of the main  elements of conventional  Western  proposals  for eco- 
nomic  reform,  with a discussion  of the relevance  of these recommendations  for the new 
sovereign  states, see Nordhaus,  Peck, and  Richardson  in this volume. 
4.  "But years  of suppressed  anger  over nationality  issues, combined  with  the natural 
instinct of each republic  and city to protect  itself against  the chaos of the system as a 
whole, may  give such  force  to separatism  that  there  remains  little  support  for  even a loose 
economic  union." Hewett  (1990,  p. 167). 
5. Aslund  (1989,  p. 21). 
6.  Shelton  (1989);  Aslund  (1991). William W. Hogan  305 
Current  estimates have the 1991  central  budget deficit approaching  20 
percent  of gross national  product;  official  prices have already  more  than 
doubled  this year, and there are many reports  of imminent  hyperinfla- 
tion.7  Of course, the effect of official  inflation  is confounded  in a system 
with such extensive grey and black markets. However, even prices in 
these markets  have been on the rise, with a recent sale of dollars at- 
tracting  a bid of 75 rubles  per dollar  in a currency  auction  in Tallinn,  Es- 
tonia,  in July 1991  .8 Rapid  depreciation  of the ruble  worries  common  cit- 
izens and  foreign  investors  and  reinforces  the appearance  and  reality  of 
economic  collapse. 
The old economic system was organized  like a wheel, with the hub  in 
Moscow and communications  along  the spokes. Despite the skill of So- 
viet managers,  who work  around  the constraints  of the system,9  there  is 
an astonishing  lack of information  at the enterprise  level about  suppliers 
or customers. Without  this information,  the enterprises  are floundering 
and  production  is falling.  Control  by the central  ministries  has withered 
and no organized  system has been created to take their place. As a re- 
sult, Gosplan and others have been warning  of a fall in output in the 
state sector in 1991  that will rival the Great Depression in the United 
States.  10  As the new leaders  turn  from  their  political  miracle  to face their 
economic  misfortune,  they must surely  agree  with Oscar  Wilde:  "When 
the gods wish to punish  us they answer  our  prayers.  " I  I 
Everyone  in the old Soviet Union recognizes  the urgent  need for eco- 
nomic  reform  in the direction  of freer  markets,  but  there  is no agreement 
on the steps needed to make that move. The problem  runs far deeper 
than  just a lack of familiarity  with markets  and capitalism.  The leader- 
ship  and  the population  are steeped  in a communist  ideology  and  the val- 
7. Clines,  "A Bleak  Economy,"  p. A8. 
8.  United  Press International,  "Dollar  Fetches 75 Rubles  at Estonia  Auction," July 
10,1991. 
9. Hewett  (1988,  p. 160). 
10. "You have to grasp  the enormousness  of the impending  Soviet economic  failure. 
In  the Great  Depression,  U.S. gross  national  product  (the  nation's  output)  dropped  30  per- 
cent  between  1929  and 1933.  It didn't  regain  its 1929  level until  1939.  Unemployment  aver- 
aged  18  percent  for  the  decade.  The  Soviet Union  is now  approaching  a comparable  calam- 
ity. In the first  half of 1991,  its GNP declined  about 10 percent. 'By the end of 1991,  it's 
going  to fall 20 percent,'  Soviet economist  Vladimir  Popov recently  told Barron's  maga- 
zine." See Robert  J. Samuelson,  "The Coming  Soviet Slump," Washington  Post, Sep- 
tember4, 1991,  p. A19. 
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ues that  accompany  it. The death  of the Communist  party  does not guar- 
antee full burial  of its ideals. For instance, notwithstanding  the fact that 
the distribution  of income  in the Soviet Union  already  reflects  disparities 
far  from  the communist  ideal,'2  every reform  initiative  faces criticism  if 
in the end it favors some citizens over others, such as those who work 
over those who do not. Former  Prime  Minister  Valentin  Pavlov's April 
1991 "reform"  of raising  prices, and then wages to compensate  for 85 
percent  of the price  increase,  13 was seen in many  quarters  as necessary, 
or at least understandable.  Given  the dire straits  of the poorest citizens, 
whose monthly  pensions recently averaged  only about 55 rubles,"4  an 
emphasis on "social protection" permeates evaluations  of every spe- 
cific proposal  for revamping  the economy. The concern  is laudable;  the 
challenge  will be to target  social protection  without  distorting  the entire 
economy.  15 
The values of communism  and central  planning  will be hard  to leave 
behind. In Ukraine, radical  proposals for tax reform in October 1990 
contained numerous "administrative"  taxes  applying to  deviations 
from norms in wages, employment,  and production,  thereby restoring 
central  planning  through  tax levies. More  recently, reform  legislation  on 
foreign  economic activity focused so heavily on an onerous division of 
the economic pie that there seemed little reason to hope that the pie 
would ever appear.  There was no attention  to tax holidays or other in- 
centives to stimulate  foreign  economic activity. These relapses are all 
part  of the same tale. Soviet economic statistics  routinely  exclude most 
useful services as unproductive;  investment  occurs without  any provi- 
sion to recover capital;  and brokers  ("speculators") are subject to ar- 
rest. To Western  eyes these policies are anomalies  and present serious 
handicaps  for economic reform;  to the average  Soviet these conditions 
seem natural.  Clearly,  underlying  Soviet values must  be unlearned.  This 
will be no easy task. 
12. Bergson  (1984,  pp. 1052-99). 
13. Pavlov  announced  the price  increases  with  an 85 percent  compensation  in Febru- 
ary, indicating  that the increases  would  be implemented  sometime  before  October  1991. 
See "Soviet Premier  Reveals  Consumer  Pricing  Plan;  Compensation  to Be Paid  for  Higher 
Costs," Washington  Post, February  19, 1991,  p. A6. In the event, official  prices  rose in 
April 1991, with one price index jumping 170 percent in that month; see Shleifer  and 
Vishny  in this volume  (especially  table  3). 
14. In 1988,  the average  monthly  pension  on collective  farms  was 54.3  rubles. 
International  Monetary  Fund  and  others  (1991,  vol. 2, p. 211). 
15. Williamson  (1991,  p. 82). William W. Hogan  307 
Interdependent  Sovereign  States 
The devolution of power to the individual sovereign  states will com- 
plicate at least the theory of the economic  transition. In addition to the 
task of developing individual economic reform plans, given little experi- 
ence and a decades-long  brain drain to Moscow,16  the newly sovereign 
states must confront their pervasive  interdependence.  Years of central 
planning have bound these  sovereign  states together in ways  that sur- 
pass normal conditions in market economies: 
The Soviet economy  embraces  a substantial  interregional  division  of labor,  aris- 
ing in part from varying comparative  advantages and a common economic 
union. The division of labor  is reinforced  by two factors more peculiar  to the 
Soviet economic  system. The first  is the organization  of the economic  ministries 
along branch  lines, which often favors interrepublican  trade within  a ministry 
over intrarepublican  trade across ministries.  The second is the emphasis on 
economies of scale, which sometimes  leaves only 1 or 2 enterprises  supplying 
the entire  union.  17 
As shown in figure 1, trade among the former republics reflects this 
high degree of specialization.  The average percentage of interrepublican 
trade for the USSR is brought down by the relatively low trade ratio for 
Russia; all other republics are far more dependent on each other's trade, 
with interrepublican exports typically five to ten times exports abroad. 18 
Hence,  contrary to an earlier assessment  that "the Soviet  Union has a 
real choice as to whether it accompanies  reform ...  by opening up the 
economy,"  19  the new sovereign states have no such option. The rush to 
create new bilateral agreements reflects their visceral understanding of 
their interdependence through trade,20  which makes autarchy seemingly 
impossible, no matter what the political preference of the people. 
Moreover, these new negotiations among sovereign states must pro- 
ceed against a background of suspicion that the current system has ex- 
16.  For example, Grigory Yavlinsky has a Ukrainian heritage. 
17.  IMF and others (1991, vol.  1, p. 193). 
18.  IMF and others (1991, vol.  1, p. 225). 
19.  Williamson (1991, p. 80). 
20.  Ukraine and Russia signed a bilateral friendship treaty in November  1990, rein- 
forced and expanded by ajoint  communique after the surprise visit to Kiev on August 28, 
1991, by Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi and Leningrad's mayor, Anatoly Sob- 
chak.  See  Peter Maass,  "Ukraine.  Russia Agree to Inter-Republic Pact; Accord  Omits 
Significant Role by Kremlin,"  Waslington  Post,  August 29, 1991, p. A39. 308  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 















Source:  IMF and others (1991, vol.  2, p. 225). 
ploited each former  republic  to the benefit  of the others. Certainly  cur- 
rent domestic prices are so distorted  that it is no easy task to untangle 
the subsidies  or to separate  the resources  that  disappeared  into the black 
hole of the central  plan.2'  It may be that everyone will be immediately 
better  off as they assert their  independence,  but the best evidence does 
not support  this contention. Unfortunately  for the political  road ahead, 
the biggest  beneficiary  of the new trade  arrangements  is likely to be Rus- 
sia. According  to estimates of interrepublican  trade balances recalcul- 
ated to world  prices  from  current  domestic  prices, Russia, with its large 
supply  of hugely  underpriced  oil, has the most to gain  from  arm's  length 
trades.22  This fact will not sit well with the many new states that fear 
21. This  conclusion  is based  on 1988  data  from  IMF  and  others  (1991,  vol. 2, p. 14). 
22. "Remaking  the Soviet Union:  Beyond  Aid," The  Economist,  July 13, 1991,  p. 23. William  W.  Hogan  309 
Russian hegemony and have a difficult  time distinguishing  the various 
governments  in Moscow. 
In this regard  the new sovereign states should heed the experience 
of Eastern  Europe. Every effort should be made to avoid the harmful 
collapse  in trade  that  occurred  between the Soviet Union and  its former 
partners  to the west.23  This trade collapse hurt the Eastern European 
countries  and the Soviet Union, and there is little prospect that a surge 
in exports  for hard  currency,  such as occurred  in Poland,  could bail out 
the economies of the emerging  sovereign states of the former Soviet 
Union. 
Economic Reform in Ukraine 
Ukraine  is the second most populous republic  of the former  Soviet 
Union. Home to 52 million  people on 233,000  square  miles, Ukraine  re- 
sembles France  in population  and area. With  an educated  populace  and 
a wealth of  natural resources, especially agricultural  and mineral, 
Ukraine produced  just under a fifth of the net output of the Soviet 
Union.24  Ukraine  looks and feels European.  It sits across major  trans- 
portation  routes, including  virtually  all of the natural  gas pipelines con- 
necting  the Soviet Union to the west. As the most important  former  re- 
public next to Russia, Ukraine's participation  in any confederation  of 
states has been regarded  as a key to economic success.25 
Already  a member  of the United Nations, Ukraine  has a long history 
as a nation, especially in the minds  of Ukrainians.  As a Slavic people, 
there  is a natural  connection  to Russia  and Belorussia,  and Ukraine  was 
part of the original  formulation  of the Soviet Union, an historical  fact 
recently  cited by Ukraine's  president,  Leonid Kravchuk,  as an explana- 
tion of the difference  between Ukraine's  more cautious  approach  to in- 
dependence  and  the Baltic states' more  clamorous  one.26  Of course, the 
23. Williamson  (1991,  p. 69). 
24.  This conclusion  is based  on 1988  data  from  IMF  and  others  (1991,  vol. 1, p. 214). 
25. " 'The  union  cannot  survive  without  the Ukraine,  and,  I think,  the Ukraine  cannot 
survive  without  the union,' Gorbachev  said." See David  Remnick,  "Prosecutors  Charge 
13  as Coup  Leaders;  Russia  Enters  Alliance  with  the Ukraine,"  Washington  Post, August 
29, 1991,  p. A42. 
26. Leonid Kravchuk,  televised comments  before Ukrainian  Supreme  Soviet, Kiev, 
Ukraine,  September  3, 1991. 310  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
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western  parts  of Ukraine  were incorporated  from  Poland  only at the end 
of the Second World  War,  a record  reflected  in the greater  concentration 
of ethnic Ukrainians  and political  radicalism  in Lviv (see figure  2). The 
eastern and southern  parts of Ukraine, especially Crimea,  Odessa and 
its oblast, and Kharkiv  oblast, contain a large Russian  population  and 
were the targets  of a recent, hastily withdrawn,  territorial  claim by the 
Russian  Federation.  Reportedly  little more  than  a third  of this Russian 
minority  speaks the now politically  correct  Ukrainian  language.28 
Ukrainians  and their language  have long been suppressed  by Mos- 
cow. This suppression  predates the Soviet system and was probably 
worse in Czarist  times.29 Under  the Soviet system, there were alternat- 
ing periods of promotion  and repression  of Ukrainian  national  identity 
and  language,  with repression  the dominant  theme. The result  has been 
the development  of a strong  sense of anti-Soviet,  independent  Ukrainian 
nationhood,  especially among  the intelligentsia.30 
27. On  Tuesday,  August  27, 1991,  Boris  Yeltsin  released  a press statement  raising  the 
issue of territorial  claims. Peter  Maass, "Ukrainians  Fear Border  Disputes  Could  Bring 
Conflict with Russia," Washington  Post,  August 28,  1991, p.  All.  (The resulting 
furor  in Ukraine  over the original  mention  of territorial  disputes  precipitated  the sudden 
visit of a Russian  delegation  the next day.) 
28. IMF  and  others  (1991,  vol. 1, p. 205). 
29. "The state of Ukrainian  language  publishing  is graphically  portrayed  by statistics 
on the number  of books and  brochures  that  appeared  (in the Russian  Empire  as a whole) 
between 1798  and 1916  (inclusive).  In that 118-year  period  3,214  titles saw publication,  on 
the average  27 titles per  year  for a population  of approximately  20 million!"  Krawchenko 
(1985,  p. 27). 
30. Krawchenko  (1985,  p. 253). William  W.  Hogan  311 
Ukrainians'  outrage  at their oppression  is often interpreted  in terms 
of hostility  toward  Russia and Russians, which might  imply special dif- 
ficulties  for ethnic Russians  in Ukraine  or for any future  cooperation  in 
an economic  federation.  The Supreme  Soviet of Crimea,  an autonomous 
region  in Ukraine  with a large  majority  of ethnic  Russians, is reportedly 
considering  declaring  its own independence. However, evidence sug- 
gests that  the real  hostility  focuses on communism,  the center, and  Mos- 
cow.3"  In my experience, Ukrainians  often describe the exploitation  of 
Ukraine  as matched  or exceeded only by the exploitation  of Russia be- 
yond the center. If true, the implications  for future  economic coopera- 
tion are clear. Ukrainians  are disposed by history and driven by eco- 
nomic necessity to cooperate with Russia and the other republics. 
However, in the minds  of Ukrainians,  this cooperation  can proceed  only 
between full, independent,  sovereign  partners.  Any bow to Moscow or 
a reborn  center will be roundly  criticized  in Kiev. 
This tendency  is evident  in the attacks  on President  Kravchuk  for his 
recent agreement  to participate  in Gorbachev's new State Council of 
ten.32  Ukraine is developing a large and increasingly  vigorous demo- 
cratic  political  movement.  Organized  in 1989,  the Popular  Movement  of 
Ukraine  for Restructuring  (Rukh)  is a consortium  of democratic,  anti- 
communist  groups  organized  under  the leadership  of poet Ivan  Drach.33 
Strongest in western Ukraine, Rukh overcame official roadblocks to 
place a large  minority  of deputies in the first  elections to the Ukrainian 
parliament.  More recently, Narodna Rada ("people's council") has 
evolved to organize  the opposition and launch a political campaign  to 
gain  control  of the parliament.  Rukh,  Narodna  Rada  (which  immediately 
denounced the Yannayev coup on August 19), and other new demo- 
cratic opposition organizations  have offered their own candidates  for 
the first  popular  election to the presidency, scheduled  for December 1, 
1991. The political agendas of Rukh and Narodna Rada have empha- 
sized independence  from  Moscow, complete  and  uncompromising.  The 
popularity  of their  agendas  has been so pervasive among  Ukrainians  of 
31. Roman  Szporluk,  "Clever  Ukrainians,"  New York  Times,  August  1, 1991,  p. A21. 
32.  ". . . the opposition here called for a press conference  and denounced the move as 
the end of our week-long  'paper  independence.'  For them it is impermissible  that Krav- 
chuk supported  any kind  of announcement  that hints  at the future  existence of a central 
authority."  Report  by Santiago  Eder  on Narodna  Rada  press conference,  Kiev, Ukraine, 
September  2, 1991. 
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all ethnic  persuasions  that  the theme  was embraced  in recent  months  by 
communist leaders like President Kravchuk, preempting  the opposi- 
tion's main  issue.34  After the coup, Kravchuk  again  emphasized  the in- 
dependence  theme as the first in his list of five principal  positions that 
would govern any arrangements  with a new confederation  of states. 
With the Communist  party in disarray, the democratic movement's 
pressure  for real  independence  will only grow. 
Ukraine  will be a sovereign state, and it will take charge  of its own 
economic  reform  program.  Ukrainian  laws have been declared  supreme 
on Ukrainian  territory,  and their supremacy  now looks like reality not 
rhetoric.  Ukraine  has asserted  ownership  of all property  on its territory. 
Ukrainian  control of its ecology is a priority  that cannot be left to the 
center, which created  Chernobyl,  the symbol  of exploitation.35  Ukraine 
is now looking  to its own currency,  fiscal  regime,  privatization  program, 
defense conversion, and so on. As of yet, there  is little concern  and less 
interest in trying to coordinate  these policies as part of a larger  plan 
across all republics.  The implications  are only beginning  to unfold. 
Currency Reform 
Almost unanimously, all economic reform plans or conversations 
originating  in the center have assumed  the need to preserve  a single all- 
union  currency  and monetary  policy. Eduard  Shevardnadze  included  a 
single currency  in his "minimalist"  list of central  functions  that should 
be preserved.36  Yavlinsky  in his "Grand  Bargain,"  and Stanislav  Sha- 
talin  before  him, assumed  the continuation  of a single  currency.  Equally 
unanimously,  Ukrainian  leaders  hold to the necessity of creating  a new 
34. " 'Kravchuk  is talking  about  independence  now, but we have been talking  about 
it for years. He is very crafty,' complained  Vyacheslav  Chornovil,  an opposition  leader 
and 16-year  political  prisoner  who  was chosen  yesterday  by the  Rukh  independence  move- 
ment  as its presidential  candidate."  See Peter  Maass, "Crafty  or Committed?"  Washing- 
ton Post,  September 2,  1991, p. A17. This trend had been anticipated:  ".  . . republican 
leaders  find  it not only politically  profitable  but  imperative  to fight  for their  sovereignty  in 
an attempt  to abandon  what  appears  to them  to be a sinking  ship." Hewett  (1990,  p. 166). 
35. "At  present  the Ukraine  has  on paper  sound  environmental  regulations  and  legisla- 
tion. Unfortunately,  twenty  years  of NEPA  laws  and  regulations  in the United  States  have 
clearly  demonstrated  that  environmental  laws and  regulations  alone  simply  do not work." 
ZumBrunnen  (1990,  p. 30). 
36. Eduard  Shevardnadze,  seminar  at Harvard  University,  June  7, 1991. William W. Hogan  313 
Ukrainian  currency  and  managing  their  own monetary  policy. President 
Kravchuk  has endorsed  this goal, long advocated  by Volodymyr  Pylyp- 
chuk, Rukh member  and chairman  of the Economic Reform  Commis- 
sion of the Ukrainian  parliament.  The parliament's  nearly unanimous 
election of Volodymyr  Matvienko  as chairman  of the new Ukrainian 
State  Bank,  on June  20, 1991,  was widely  interpreted  as a vote in support 
of establishing  the hryvna  as the new Ukrainian  currency. 
The Ukrainians'  motivations  are many. They recognize and fear the 
consequences of a ruble and a central budget  out of control.37  The de- 
scriptions  of the current  huge central  deficit, the collapse of tax collec- 
tions, the forced borrowing  from  banks, and the printing  of new money 
raise  the specter  of hyperinflation  and  financial  collapse. If one has little 
confidence  in Moscow, one has little hope that the ruble  can be saved. 
There is even serious discussion in Kiev of the need to expand the 
Ukrainian  budget  deficit  to avoid being  left behind  in the war of relative 
inflation  across the republics. 
Ukrainians  report  that Moscow's control of the banks has allowed 
practices  that  would  cause a revolution  anywhere.  For example,  with  no 
checking  accounts or credit cards, Ukraine  is highly dependent  on the 
regular  use of the 800  million  bank  notes in circulation.38  Each  month  the 
enterprises  must  queue  up at the bank  to convert  their  rubles  on account 
into the paper  money needed to pay their workers. However, as a nor- 
mal  practice,  release of the cash would be delayed or denied  unless the 
enterprise  complied with some disputed  directive regarding  allocation 
of production,  remission  of foreign  currency,  transfer  of accounts, and 
so on. No wonder  that control of the currency  and the banking  system 
is repeatedly  listed by Ukrainians  as the first priority  of economic re- 
form.  The experiment  with Ukrainian  coupons in the spring  of 1991,  de- 
signed  to prevent  the sale of goods to other republics  for worthless ru- 
bles,39  was also viewed as a first step toward  creating  a new currency. 
37. "Lenin  is said  to have  declared  that  the best way to destroy  the  capitalist  system  is 
to debauch  the currency.  By a continuing  process  of inflation  governments  can  confiscate, 
secretly  and  unobserved,  an important  part  of the wealth  of their  citizens . . . Lenin  was 
certainly  right."  John  Maynard  Keynes, as quoted  in Andrews  (1990). 
38. Estimate  by Nicholas  Jequier,  personal  communication,  May 1991. 
39. After  President  Bush's visit to Kiev on August  1, 1991,  Ukrainians  disagreed  with 
his call for avoidance  of trade  barriers  and  close cooperation  with  Moscow:  "The  head  of 
the parliamentary  committee on economic reform, Volodymyr Pylypchuk, said the 
Ukraine  was forced  to take protectionist  measures  because  of the general  collapse  of the 314  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
Improved  coupons  were  introduced  in August,  and  the plan  calls for cur- 
rency-quality,  reusable  coupons shortly.40  Ukraine  may soon confront 
the challenges  of managing  a money supply, setting  exchange  rates, and 
dealing  with  all  the arcana  of central  banking.  The West may  need to sug- 
gest the best approaches  rather  than  arguing  the merits  of the decision.4 
Fiscal  Reform 
Ukraine  plans to have complete control over taxation and state ex- 
penditures.  Even before the coup, debate over the now defunct nine- 
plus-one treaty concentrated  on the role of the republics  in controlling 
taxation  and  any payments  to the center. After  the coup, with  the disso- 
lution  of the old Soviet Union, there  will be little interest  in leaving any 
significant  taxing  authority  with the center, and  the sovereign  states will 
seek to regulate contributions  to any central budget. Hence manage- 
ment  of fiscal policy will be spread  across the many  governments  of the 
sovereign  states, adding  another  pressure  to create  a new currency.  One 
key will be to develop  the new institutions  that  can protect  the monetary 
authorities  from  the probably  inevitable  pressure  to finance  state deficits 
by expansion  of the money supply. 
Privatization 
In May 1991, Ukraine's parliament  elected 39-year-old  Volodymyr 
Lanovoy as the new state minister  for Property  and Entrepreneurship, 
his first position in government  after spending  the past year leading a 
team drafting  reform  legislation  for the parliament.  Nominated  and sup- 
ported by both Pylypchuk  and Vitold Fokin, prime minister  and com- 
Soviet economy. He accused  the central  government  of flooding  the country  with  worth- 
less rubles, forcing republics  such as the Ukraine  to defend themselves as best they 
could....  'The  ruble  is a dead  currency,'  he said. 'Bush  does not seem to understand  that 
we are forced to take measures  to prevent  our economy collapsing  completely.' " Ann 
Devroy  and  Michael  Dobbs, "Bush  Warns  Ukraine  on Independence;  President  Supports 
Gorbachev's  Union Treaty  in Kiev Speech," Washington  Post, August 2, 1991,  p. Al. 
These  sentiments  were  anticipated:  "Republics  and  even cities will  respond  to the crisis  by 
seeking  to hold  onto  the scarce  products  that  they produce,  increasing  the  fragmentation  of 
the economy." Hewett  (1990,  p. 166). 
40. Volodymyr  Pylypchuk,  personal  communication,  August  5, 1991. 
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munist  at the time, Lanovoy is an economist who sees himself with a 
broad  and  broadly  supported  mandate  to develop and  implement  a radi- 
cal program  to move to a market  economy. His responsibilities  include 
privatization,  development  of small  business, creation  of an antimonop- 
oly program,  and  more. Lanovoy  is familiar  with  the ongoing  experience 
in Eastern  Europe, and he participated  in a recent workshop  on priva- 
tization  in Gdansk.42  Senior  members  of his team of Ukrainian  advisers 
attended  a similar  workshop  in Prague  in July.43  Lanovoy and his col- 
leagues  are astute and  eager. 
In August, before the coup, Lanovoy and his team were working  on 
an ambitious  program  for massive, wide-ranging  privatization  of state 
enterprises  in Ukraine.  The first  step was to develop a legal foundation 
for asserting  ownership  of all property  on Ukrainian  territory.  Title to 
this property  would rest with the newly created State Property  Fund. 
Optimistically,  this confrontation  with the center was expected to re- 
quire  months  of preparation  and  legal warfare,  and Lanovoy was confi- 
dent of ultimate  success. After  the coup, this legal battle  was measured 
in hours  not months;  apparently  the center lost by default,  and Ukraine 
will now control  all the property  within  its borders. 
This development  will accelerate the Ukrainian  program  for priva- 
tization,  though  the task ahead  for Lanovoy and  his colleagues  is daunt- 
ing.44  Much  like that in Poland  and other socialist countries, the Ukrai- 
nian  economy  is dominated  by very large  enterprises.  As shown  in figure 
3 for Soviet industry,  there  are several  thousand  large  state enterprises. 
42. Workshop  on the Social  and  Political  Consequences  of Privatization,  Gdansk,  Po- 
land,  April  10-12, 1991.  The  conference  was organized  by Project  Liberty  of Harvard  Uni- 
versity  and  The  Gdansk  Institute  for Market  Economics,  Gdansk,  Poland. 
43. Privatization  seminar, Central  European  University, Prague, Czechoslovakia, 
July  26-30, 1991. 
44. "The  problems  inherent  in the economic  transformation  that  Ukraine  is currently 
contemplating  are, of course, enormous.  The historical  structure  of the economy means 
that important  skills and institutions  of a market  economy are lacking  in Ukraine.  Few 
concentrations  of capital  are  available  for  commercial  investment.  Capital  markets  in debt 
and  equity  as well as the popular  understanding  of the role of capital  are  very underdevel- 
oped. Few people  have the necessary  skills  for assessing  a business,  monitoring  manage- 
ment  in a competitive  market  environment,  or making  a financial  valuation.  The domestic 
private  sector is dwarfed  by the state sector, which is often deliberately  structured  in a 
monopolistic  manner.  Additionally,  there are pervasive conflicts of interest  among  the 
state bureaucrats  who are often mainly  interested  in their  own personal  futures."  Palmer 
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Figure 3.  Size Distribution of Soviet Firms,  1988 
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Source: IMF  and  others  (1991,  vol. 2, p. 31). 
Although  I do not have comparable  data for Ukraine, the distribution 
would be similar.  The total Ukrainian  privatization  program  must deal 
with upwards  of 30,000 state enterprises,  including  perhaps 15,000  en- 
terprises  of more than 1,000  employees, and 1,000  enterprises  of more 
than 3,000  employees.45  There  has been talk of privatizing  50 percent  of 
these enterprises  by the end of 1992. 
Considering  the experience of Poland, East Germany,  and the other 
Eastern  European  countries,  these statistics  could easily paralyze.  The 
pressure  for rapid  privatization  is enormous,  as this is the promised  cure 
for economic stagnation.  Equally  compelling  is the fear that  this pace is 
practically  and  politically  impossible: 
45. Volodymyr  Lanovoy,  personal  communication,  August  3, 1991. William W. Hogan  317 
The  fact that  a large  part  of the country's  capital  stock may be nonviable  carries 
with it a potential  danger  that a rapid  exposure  of the enterprises  with negative 
value to the rigors  of hard  budget  constraints  and a competitive  environment 
may result in a string  of bankruptcies,  leading  to a swift fall in production  and 
skyrocketing  levels of unemployment.  This, in turn,  may  destabilize  the  political 
situation  and  endanger  the whole reform  process.46 
Perhaps  Jahnos  Kornai's  counsel against  any "vain hope" of speedy pri- 
vatization, based on his distillation  of Hungarian  experience, gives a 
glimpse of the complexity of the problem. "The proportions  between 
the private  and state sectors will shift in the former's  favor continually 
(and  one hopes, as fast as possible), but there is still a lengthy  period  of 
coexistence between them ahead."47  Lanovoy is addressing this di- 
lemma  now, but he does not look to Moscow for help. 
Defense  Conversion 
Conversion  of defense enterprises  from military  to civilian produc- 
tion is an essential requirement  for improvement  of the Ukrainian  econ- 
omy. Compared  with the West, Soviet military  enterprises  occupy far 
more of the economy and dominate  the better technologies. In the ex- 
isting  structure,  the best talent  and the best plants  fall under  the control 
of the defense ministries.  By definition,  therefore,  successful economic 
reform  must include  reform  through  conversion  of these military  enter- 
prises. Even entrepreneurs  creating  new enterprises  will look to the ex- 
isting  pool of talent  and  technology  in the defense sector. 
Ukrainian  leaders  recognize  the need to convert  defense enterprises. 
These enterprises  have already  faced dramatic  reductions  of 30 to 50 
percent  in the volume of "state orders" for military  goods. Nothing in 
their experience with central planning  and central direction has pre- 
pared  the defense enterprises  for this new world  of product  and market 
development.  Hence leaders of defense enterprises  must reorient  their 
organizations  and  develop new skills  for a new world, and  this responsi- 
bility now falls to the leadership  in Ukraine.  In May 1991,  Viktor  Anto- 
nov, then in his first days as Ukraine's state minister  for the Military 
Complex  and Conversion,  made  a bold claim: "I believe 100  percent  of 
the military  complex located on Ukrainian  territory  will come under  di- 
46. Frydman  and  Rapaczynski  (1991,  p. 22). 
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rect Ukrainian control, starting on  1 January 1992."  48  Another an- 
swered  prayer. 
Reviews of past military  conversion  efforts  in the West find  virtually 
no examples  of successful conversion  in the narrow  Ukrainian  sense of 
changing  an existing  plant  and  production  team  working  for the military 
market  and redirecting  them to produce for the civilian market.49  The 
problem  centers  on the essential  culture  of the military  production  enter- 
prise:  hierarchical  organization,  single-customer  negotiations,  cost-plus 
pricing,  and small-batch  runs. By contrast,  a market  economy requires 
decentralization,  market  research, value pricing,  and mass production 
or multiple  products  for market  niches. Organizations  built  for one role 
have floundered  when confronted  with the new challenge.  The cultural 
shift  is too onerous. Successful  conversion  has come from  shrinking  the 
old and growing  the new. Human  and capital  resources must leave the 
existing  enterprises  and  migrate  to new organizations. 
This message is bad news for a Ukraine  encumbered  with the central 
planning  legacies  of an immobile  labor  force and  virtually  no capital  mar- 
ket. In the Ukrainian  context, therefore, enterprise and government 
leaders must look at methods for reorganizing  existing entities and di- 
recting them to operate in a market  economy. In the few cases in the 
West where a new organization  arose under  the banner  of the old com- 
pany, the process required  selective skimming  of people and resources. 
In addition,  the transformation  required  sustained  protection  of the new 
division  to allow innovation  and  to insulate  the new firm  from  the proce- 
dures, structures,  and standards  of the old.50  All this requires  the luxury 
of time  and  resources,  neither  of which  is in abundant  supply  in Ukraine. 
Conclusion 
The evidence from Ukraine of the drive for true independence  has 
parallels  in each of the new sovereign states. The Baltics are gone; the 
other sovereign states will slowly assert control over their own eco- 
nomic reform  plans, if only out of self-defense. The initial  reaction of 
48. CONVERSION'91,  military  conversion  conference,  Kiev, Ukraine,  May 27-29, 
1991,  organized  by the Project  on Economic  Reform  in Ukraine. 
49. Lynch  (1987,  p. 5). 
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many  Western  analysts has been to applaud  the political  revolution  but 
to view the expanding  economic chaos with dismay. For these highly 
interdependent  economies, a little central  design has appeal  from afar. 
Managing  many new currencies seems to create multiplicative  prob- 
lems. And  the specter  of Yugoslavia  gives us all  pause;  it is in everyone'  s 
interest  to avoid any expansion or spread  of violence among  the many 
ethnic  groups  scattered  across these new states of the old Soviet Union. 
However, the emerging  nation cannot go back to a strong union. 
Western  misgivings  may  be well founded. "But  the fact is that  what  hap- 
pens in the Soviet Union is far too important  for the West to stand by 
and watch with no attempt to help the Soviets sift sense from non- 
sense."95'  The West's principal  task today must be to mount  large-scale 
programs  of technical  assistance, on an emergency  basis, to help in the 
sifting. And this effort must now be directed to the new sovereign 
states.52  Looking on the bright  side, with many parallel  reform  experi- 
ments under  way, there will be much that one state can learn  from an- 
other, and the individual  mistakes  will be somewhat smaller  and more 
contained. The challenge  will surely provide all the challenge that one 
could want in new and  unmapped  terrains. 
51. Williamson(1991,  p.85). 
52. The presidium  of the Ukrainian  Soviet has an advisory  council  organized  by Boh- 
dan Hawrylyshyn  of Switzerland  with support  from the Soros Foundation.  Harvard's 
Project  on Economic  Reform  in Ukraine  is working  with  the Council  of Ministers  and  the 
parliamentary  Commission  on Economic Reform, and the program  on Strengthening 
Democratic  Institutions  has many  connections  in Moscow. The Hudson  Institute  is work- 
ing closely with  the Baltics. Similar  initial  efforts  are  under  way elsewhere. But individu- 
ally and  collectively  these are  drops  on a parched  land. 